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DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS

NOFORN-	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT-	Not Releasable to Contractors or Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN-	Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON-	Dissemination and Extraction of Information Controlled by Originator
REL . . .-	This Information has been Authorized for Release to . . .

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TESTIMONY TO THE SSCI ON INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS
WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS, 21 MAY 1986

GENTLEMEN:

EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333, 4 DECEMBER 1981, SECTION 1.5(e), ASSIGNS THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY TO FORMULATE U.S. POLICIES "CONCERNING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ARRANGEMENTS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS" AND TO COORDINATE "FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN AGENCIES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE INTELLIGENCE OR INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS."

E.O. 12333, SECTION 1.11(i) GIVES THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AUTHORITY TO "ESTABLISH AND MAINTAIN MILITARY INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE PROGRAMS WITH SELECTED COOPERATIVE FOREIGN DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ENSURE THAT SUCH RELATIONSHIPS AND PROGRAMS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH POLICIES FORMULATED BY THE DCI." THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DELEGATED TO THE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, APPROVAL AUTHORITY TO NEGOTIATE AND CONCLUDE NON-SIGINT INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS, WITH OVERSIGHT BY THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY) (DUSD/P) AND REVIEW BY OTHER DOD COMPONENTS, SUCH AS THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS),

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AS NECESSARY. ANY NEW PLANNED OFFICIAL CONTACTS OR OTHER ACTIONS BY DOD COMPONENTS TO ESTABLISH ARRANGEMENTS (WRITTEN OR ORAL) FOR INTELLIGENCE OR INTELLIGENCE-RELATED PURPOSES WITH AN ELEMENT OF A FOREIGN ORGANIZATION, OTHER THAN AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND IN WHICH DOD COMPONENTS PARTICIPATE, MUST BE COORDINATED IN ADVANCE WITH THE APPROPRIATE DCI REPRESENTATIVE.

THE DCI HAS ESTABLISHED POLICIES, PROCEDURES, AND CRITERIA FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS IN A NUMBER OF DIRECTIVES THAT HAVE BEEN ISSUED TO MEMBERS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN ONE OF THESE, THE GUIDING POLICY FOR THESE RELATIONSHIPS IS CLEARLY STATED AS: "U.S. INTELLIGENCE IS A NATIONAL ASSET TO BE CONSERVED AND PROTECTED AND WILL BE SHARED WITH FOREIGN ENTITIES ONLY WHEN AN IDENTIFIABLE ADVANTAGE CAN BE EXPECTED TO ACCRUE TO THE UNITED STATES." THAT DIRECTIVE ALSO EMPHASIZES THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS WILL NOT BE SUBJECT TO UNACCEPTABLE RISK IN THESE FOREIGN LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS AND THAT THE EXCHANGES WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.

SPECIFIC PROCEDURES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT AND CONDUCT OF INTELLIGENCE RELATIONSHIPS WITH FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS ARE DELINEATED IN OTHER DCI DIRECTIVES, THE IMAGERY POLICY MANUAL, AND THE SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE SECURITY REGULATIONS. NDP-1, "NATIONAL POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS," ISSUED PURSUANT TO NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION MEMORANDUM 119, GUIDES THE RELEASE OF CLASSIFIED MILITARY INFORMATION.

IN FOREIGN AREAS, THE CIA CHIEFS OF STATION HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED TO ACT AS THE DCI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN CARRYING OUT COORDINATION OF ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ABROAD, INCLUDING LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE DOD, THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMPONENTS MUST PROVIDE ANY PROPOSAL TO ESTABLISH LIAISON WITH A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICE FOR COORDINATION TO THE CHIEF OF STATION OR TO THE DCI'S DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE AT CIA HEADQUARTERS. IN THE FIELD, THE U.S. CHIEF OF MISSION IS CONSULTED, AND THE PROPOSAL IS REVIEWED IN TERMS OF THE OVERALL U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. IF THE PROPOSED LIAISON IS DEEMED POTENTIALLY HARMFUL BY THE CHIEF OF STATION OR THE U.S. CHIEF OF MISSION, THE ISSUE IS REFERRED TO WASHINGTON FOR CONSULTATION AMONG THE DCI, THE SECRETARY OF STATE, AND THE HEAD OF THE APPROPRIATE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COMPONENT. ONCE A RELATIONSHIP IS ESTABLISHED, THE CHIEF OF STATION MUST BE KEPT FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED ON ITS STATUS.

FOR EXAMPLE, A U.S. DEFENSE ATTACHE WHO WISHES TO ESTABLISH A FORMAL WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH A DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIAL IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY WOULD FIRST SUBMIT HIS PROPOSAL TO DO SO FOR ENDORSEMENT TO THE CHIEF OF STATION, WHO WOULD CONSULT WITH THE CHIEF OF MISSION. AFTER THIS ENDORSEMENT IS RECEIVED -- AND IT IS DIA'S POLICY NOT TO PURSUE A PROPOSAL UNLESS IT IS ENDORSED BY THE CHIEF OF STATION AND THE CHIEF OF MISSION -- DIA WILL INFORM

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THERE ARE, OF COURSE, VARIOUS TYPES OF LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS DEPENDING ON THE OVERALL U.S. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COUNTRY CONCERNED AND THE PURPOSE OF THE LIAISON. SOME ARE BASED ON FORMAL AGREEMENTS OR MEMORANDA OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN U.S. INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR FOREIGN COUNTERPARTS. OTHERS ARE BASED ON SEMIFORMAL OR INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS WHERE THERE HAS BEEN AN EXCHANGE OF CORRESPONDENCE OR AN ORAL AGREEMENT.

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IN CONCLUSION, MANY LIAISON SERVICES HAVE GONE TO CONSIDERABLE POLITICAL RISK TO SUPPORT US ON A BASIS OF TRUST THAT WE CAN PROTECT THEIR INFORMATION. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON US TO PROTECT THAT TRUST. LEAKS CAN HAVE A SERIOUS, ADVERSE EFFECT WITH LONG-TERM RAMIFICATIONS. THIS IS WHY, ALONG WITH OUR OWN SOURCES, WE PROTECT THESE METHODS OF COLLECTION AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT WITH A HIGH DEGREE OF SECURITY.

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SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Relationships with Foreign Governments
Wednesday, 21 May 1986
0930-1200 Hours
SH-219

WITNESS LIST

WITNESSES:

Mr. William J. Casey **Director of Central Intelligence**

ACCOMPANIED BY:

VADM E.A. Burkhalter, Jr., USN **Director, Intelligence Community Staff**
Mr. R. Evan Hineman **Deputy Director for Science and Technology, CIA**
Mr. Clair George **Deputy Director for Operations, CIA**
Mr. David Gries **Director, Office of Congressional Affairs, CIA**
Admiral Thomas Brooks **Assistant Director for JCS Support**
 Defense Intelligence Agency

Chief, Exchanges and Disclosures Division,
Office of External Relations, DIA

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Mr. Thomas E. DuHadway **Deputy Assistant Director of**
 Intelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mr. Robert Moran **Legislative Liaison, Federal Bureau of Investigation**

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Deputy Director for Plans and Policy
National Security Agency

Legislative Affairs Office, NSA

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
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


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